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Abstract 
Burying deceased family members in familial gravesites close to 
the homestead of the living has been a well-established practice 
in Southern Africa for many centuries. In terms of indigenous 
cultural and religious norms proximate burials are essential for 
enabling ancestors to commune amongst themselves and with 
their living descendants. In the colonial and apartheid eras many 
African communities lost ownership of their land. One of the 
consequences was that they needed permission from white 
landowners to continue with burials in established gravesites. In 
the democratic era the legislature sought to reintroduce a burial 
right for rural black land occupiers. Section 6(2)(dA) of the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 allowed occupiers 
to assert a right of familial burial as against landowners, provided 
certain conditions were met. In Selomo v Doman 2014 JDR 0780 
(LCC) Spilg J permitted a burial despite the fact that the applicant 
and deceased had not been resident near their family gravesite 
for many years. In our analysis of the judgment we suggest that 
the court's attempts to find justification in the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and the Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 were misconstrued. With proximate 
familial burials being essentially a matter of respect for dignity 
and indigenous culture, the court should have engaged in a 
deeper analysis of constitutional rights. 
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1  Introduction 
This constitutes the holistic philosophy of Africans, to bury our loved ones so 
that we can always have reference to their resting places and to ensure 
continuity.1 
In Southern Africa, proximate burials of family members have for many 
centuries been an established indigenous cultural practice. To facilitate 
communing with ancestors deceased family members have traditionally 
been buried close to homesteads where relatives live.2 As stated by the 
applicants in Serole v Pienaar3 (hereafter Serole) "…the culture of 
indigenous black people requires the dead to be buried close to the living".4 
Aside from deceased members of a family being kept close to the homes of 
the living it is also envisaged in indigenous culture that the ancestors may 
commune amongst themselves.5 For this reason, familial group gravesites 
have tended to be maintained. Remaining close to the members of one's 
extended family after death is regarded as so important that dying is often 
referred to as "going home".6 In the traditional view, burying deceased family 
members in a familial communal gravesite is therefore an essential part of 
respecting their dignity.7 
However, during the colonial and apartheid eras the traditional practice of 
establishing multiple gravesites for extended family members became more 
difficult to implement.8 An increasing proportion of the black population was 
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1  Ngubane 2004 Indilinga 171, 173. 
2  As noted by Setsiba Mourning Rituals and Practices 27: "African people have 
traditionally used their homestead as a final resting place where their dead would be 
buried. As an example a man would be buried in a kraal in the yard of the homestead. 
This was done because there was a specific meaning attached to the dead being 
buried at their home. Dlukulu (2010) explains this concept as place identity. There is 
often an attachment to place, which has become woven into the individual's personal 
identity. Every person has an environmental past that consists of places, spaces and 
their properties which have served instrumentally in the satisfaction of one's biological, 
psychological, social and cultural needs which serve as part of the socialization 
process during which self-identity is developed." 
3  2000 1 SA 328 (LCC). 
4  Serole v Pienaar 2000 1 SA 328 (LCC) (hereafter Serole) para 14. 
5  It is believed that it is essential for family members to be buried near each other in a 
familial graveyard to allow such communing: Setsiba Mourning Rituals and Practices 
17; Ngubane 2004 Indilinga 173. 
6  Setsiba Mourning Rituals and Practices 27. 
7  Ngubane 2004 Indilinga 171-172; Setsiba Mourning Rituals and Practices 27. 
8  Setsiba Mourning Rituals and Practices 27. 
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concentrated in urban environments where it was not possible to establish 
proximate familial gravesites, and in rural areas many kraal locations 
became encompassed as part of white owned farms. While white farm 
owners frequently allowed occupiers on their land to bury deceased family 
members on long-established familial gravesites, this was never in the form 
of a right and was always subject to consent. No indigenous black person 
had a right to bury a deceased loved one on land that he or she occupied 
but in which he or she had no ownership rights. The Roman-Dutch law, in 
providing owners with extensive powers to decide how their land should be 
used, forced many landless members of the black majority to seek favours 
from white landowners when implementing the practice of proximate familial 
burials.9 
In the democratic era, the legislature sought to ameliorate some of the 
numerous problems resulting from the fact that many members of the rural 
black population had been excluded from land ownership and left in the 
position of mere occupiers in places where their families had resided for 
centuries. Important in this regard is the Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act10 (hereafter ESTA). Although ESTA provides other forms of protection 
for rural land occupiers, in our discussion we consider it primarily as a 
mechanism for supporting the traditional practice of perpetuating proximate 
familial group gravesites. In particular, we evaluate the most recent and far-
reaching interpretation of ESTA by Spilg J in Selomo v Doman11 (hereafter 
Selomo). We show that, although this judgment contains numerous 
technical flaws, Spilg J appreciated that for those holding traditional 
indigenous beliefs appropriate familial burials are a crucial matter of dignity 
and respect. In recognition of this, he supportively extended the law 
governing indigenous burial practices. 
2  Background 
When promulgated in 1997 ESTA provided immediate security of tenure to 
persons qualifying as rural land occupiers. To qualify, a person needed to 
have been living on rural land with the landowner's consent, not using the 
land for commercial or industrial purposes, and earning less than R5 000 
per month.12 ESTA also provided a number of other rights. Section 5(a) 
                                            
9  See, for example, the comments made in paras 23 and 24 of Dlamini v Joosten 2006 
3 SA 342 (SCA) (hereafter Dlamini). 
10  62 of 1997. 
11  2014 JDR 0780 (LCC). 
12  Section 1 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (hereafter ESTA), 
definition of occupier together with GN R1632 in GG 19587 of 18 December 1998. 
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makes it clear that the constitutional right to human dignity is generally 
relevant to land occupation issues. Section 5(d) similarly imports freedom 
of religion, belief and expression. Of particular importance to the burials of 
family members of land occupiers is section 6(4). This states that: 
Any person shall have the right to visit and maintain his or her family graves 
on land which belongs to another person, subject to any reasonable condition 
imposed by the owner or person in charge of such land in order to safeguard 
life or property or to prevent the undue disruption of work on the land. 
Although visitation and the maintenance of graves were thus expressly 
provided for, ESTA did not specifically include a right for an occupier to bury 
a deceased family member on the land occupied. Nor did it seem to include 
a right for an occupier to be buried by family members on the land he or she 
had occupied. This was tested in Serole and Nkosi v Bűhrmann13 (hereafter 
Nkosi). 
In Serole it was argued on behalf of the applicants, as occupiers, that 
consent to bury family members could not be denied by the landowner. This 
was claimed on the basis of their rights to dignity and culture, both of which 
are protected in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) and reiterated in ESTA in sections 5 and 6, 
respectively. It was also submitted that, because section 6(4) provides a 
right to visit graves, this must imply a right to bury.14 The court concluded, 
however, that granting consent to bury and establish a grave could amount 
to the creation of a servitude over the property in the sense defined in Dibley 
v Furter.15 The court reasoned that once such consent was granted all 
successors in title would have to allow family members to visit the grave and 
would not be able to use that portion of their land.16 The court concluded 
that the right to bury therefore cannot merely be seen as one of the general 
rights granted to occupiers. It makes serious inroads into the owner's 
ownership rights. In dismissing the application Gildenhuys J concluded that: 
[a] Court will not interpret a statute in a manner which will permit rights granted 
to a person under that statute to intrude upon the common law rights of 
another, unless it is clear that such intrusion was intended.17  
In Nkosi the facts were similar, but this time the matter went to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (hereafter the SCA). In this case the appellant, who was an 
occupier of a farm owned by the respondent, applied for consent to bury her 
                                            
13  2002 1 SA 372 (SCA). 
14  Serole para 14. 
15  Dibley v Furter 1951 4 SA 73 (C) 83H-84A. 
16  Serole para 16. 
17  Serole para 16. 
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son on the farm. The SCA categorised the dispute as producing a conflict 
between the right to practise one's religion and the right not to be deprived 
of land.18 The main argument raised by the appellant was that when the 
legislature gave occupiers the right to occupy along with the right to practise 
their religion it must have envisaged that long-term occupation would result 
in deaths and that the only land available for burial would be the land 
occupied.19 Furthermore, the landowner/respondent was well aware that the 
familial burial practice was part of the religion of the occupiers.20 The 
respondent countered with an argument that the legislature could not have 
intended to deprive landowners of a right in their land without any 
compensation.21 
In delivering judgment in Nkosi, Howie JA noted that ESTA already resulted 
in a permanent diminution in the rights of the landowner if a grave was 
established on land. This was because section 6(4) gave family members 
the right to visit and maintain the grave.22 The court then considered two 
leading freedom of religion cases, S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg23 
and Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education.24 It concluded 
that these were of limited relevance in the instant case because they related 
to the vertical application of freedom of religion.25 However, neither of them 
… suggested that for the practice of one's religion one may demand 
assistance, whether financial or patrimonial, from another, much less that one 
may actively diminish another's patrimony by way of appropriation.26 
Howie JA conceded that all citizens have a right to observe and carry out 
their religious practices when burying their dead. However, there was no 
authority for the proposition "that everyone is totally free to choose where 
such burials are to be effected".27 He then held that 
… the right to freedom of religion and religious practice has internal limits. It does 
not confer unfettered liberty to choose a grave site nor does it include the right to 
take a grave site without the consent of the owner of the land concerned. It follows 
that s 5(d) of ESTA does not, when viewed in isolation, confer the right which the 
appellant claims.28 
                                            
18  Nkosi v Bűhrmann 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA) (hereafter Nkosi) para 1. 
19  Nkosi para 32. 
20  Nkosi para 32. 
21  Nkosi para 33. 
22  Nkosi para 38. 
23  1997 4 SA 1176 (CC). 
24  2000 4 SA 757 (CC). 
25  Nkosi para 44. 
26  Nkosi para 45. 
27  Nkosi para 47. 
28  Nkosi para 49. 
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The court added that, although ESTA provides for certain rights of 
occupation, it does not additionally provide a right to take land for the 
purpose of burial. Howie JA reasoned that inferring such an addition would 
not be logical. It does not make sense to say that the legislature would have 
envisaged that consent for a person merely to occupy land also entitles such 
a person to use the land permanently as a grave for a relative.29 In support 
of this he noted that ESTA did not accord either occupiers themselves or 
labour tenants a right to be buried on the land. And if they did not have such 
a right, their non-occupying family members could surely not claim one.30 In 
addition, if the legislature had wanted to create a burial right it could have 
done so expressly, but it had not. The court then concluded by dismissing 
the appeal and did not allow the burial.31 Just as in Serole, the court in Nkosi 
thus chose to protect the concept of ownership as understood in Western 
law, rather than an indigenous custom. 
Reportedly as a reaction against the approach taken in Serole,32 the 
legislature amended ESTA by promulgating the Land Affairs General 
Amendment Act.33 A new section 6(2)(dA) was inserted into the former. It 
read: 
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of section 5 and 
subsection (1), and balanced with the rights of the owner or person in charge, 
an occupier shall have the right to bury a deceased member of his or her family 
who, at the time of that person's death, was residing on the land on which the 
occupier is residing, in accordance with their religion or cultural belief, if an 
established practice in respect of the land exists. 
As can be seen, this amendment created a right to burial for certain 
deceased family members. The deceased would need to have been 
resident on the land at the time of the death, and the familial graveside must 
have already been in existence. Generally, the legislature was sending a 
signal that it wished to tip the scales at least slightly against the Western 
concept of the supremacy of land ownership rights, and more in favour of 
indigenous custom and religion. 
Just over a year after it came into force, section 6(2)(dA) was challenged in 
Nhlabathi, which was heard in the Land Claims Court (hereafter the LCC). 
In this matter a landowner claimed that the section was contrary to section 
                                            
29  Nkosi para 51. 
30  Nkosi para 53. 
31  Nkosi para 56. 
32  See Nhlabathi v Fick 2003 JDR 0226 (LCC) (hereafter Nhlabathi) para 17. 
33  51 of 2001. 
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25 of the Constitution.34 In passing, it should be noted that at the time of 
writing this case remains the only constitutional challenge to the right 
provided by section 6(2)(dA). In considering the claim of unconstitutionality, 
at the outset the court per Bam P noted that the right created by section 
6(2)(dA) is not absolute. The right to bury a family member must be 
balanced against the rights of the owner, and the right exists only if there 
has been an established practice of burials on the land.35 The court then 
considered whether the section breached section 25(1) of the Constitution 
by creating an arbitrary deprivation of property.36 In order to answer this 
question Bam P considered the seminal case on arbitrary deprivations, First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance  (hereafter FNB).37 Following the approach of 
Ackermann J in FNB, Bam held that the deprivation in Nhlabathi was not 
arbitrary.38 
In support of his decision Bam P reasoned that deprivations permitted in 
terms of the wording of section 6(2)(dA) are not arbitrary because of the 
limitations placed on them. Read as a whole, ESTA requires that all the 
rights of an occupier (including the right to bury) be balanced against the 
rights of the owner or person in charge of the land. There is thus an 
imperative to consider section 25 of the Constitution when deciding on rights 
created by section 6(2) of ESTA.39 More specifically, section 6(2)(dA) of 
ESTA inserted what might be termed four threshold requirements. Firstly, 
the deceased must have been a family member of the occupier. Secondly, 
the deceased must have been living on the land at the time of death. Thirdly, 
the burial must be in accordance with the occupier's religion or cultural 
belief. Fourthly, there must be an established practice of allowing such 
burials on the land, which is defined in section 1 as "a practice in terms of 
which the owner or person in charge … routinely gave permission …". 
                                            
34  Nhlabathi para 20. 
35  Nhlabathi para 18. 
36  Nhlabathi para 27. S 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) states that "[n]o one may be deprived of property except 
in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property". 
37  2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
38  Nhlabathi para 31. In particular, Bam P followed the test for arbitrary deprivations 
formulated by Ackermann J in First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA 
Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (hereafter FNB) para 
100. 
39  Nhlabathi para 27. 
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The logic of the court on this point was apparently that this is something that 
has to be proved before the right to bury can be claimed. The owner will 
thus have to allow burials only if he had previously and routinely given 
permission. Although the judgment is cryptic on this point, Bam P appears 
to have reasoned that deprivation for a landowner when a new grave is 
added is only slight if a burial site already exists. Bam P reasoned further 
that the purpose of the deprivation is also relevant in considering whether it 
is unlawful or not. He noted that the type of burial contemplated by section 
6(2)(dA) of ESTA is a very important imperative for many people who are 
rural land occupiers. This section had been inserted by the state to help fulfil 
its constitutional obligation to protect the tenure of persons who had been 
racially discriminated against in the past. Section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA was thus 
created to facilitate the implementation of section 25(6) of the Constitution.40 
The court then considered arguments raised by the respondent as the 
landowner. The respondent had contended that the use of land for a grave 
as envisaged by section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA amounted to an expropriation as 
referred to in section 25(2) of the Constitution. The respondent argued 
further that because it contains no provision for compensation, section 
6(2)(dA) of ESTA contravenes section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, which 
requires compensation.41 Because of this, burials without a landowner's 
consent amount to an unconstitutional expropriation.42 In responding to 
these submissions Bam P assumed, without deciding, that it may well be 
correct that section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA produces expropriations as referred 
to in section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. However, as per the dominant 
academic view on the point, any duty to compensate could be subject to the 
limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution.43 Furthermore, section 
25(3) of the Constitution requires factors such as the history of the 
acquisition of the land and the purpose of the expropriation to be taken into 
account when considering compensation.44 The court concluded that the 
cumulative effect of sections 25(3) and 36 of the Constitution, as well as 
                                            
40  The latter states that "A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure 
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress". 
41  Section 25(2) of the Constitution states that: "Property may be expropriated only in 
terms of law of general application - (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; 
and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed by those affected all decided are approved 
by a court". 
42  Nhlabathi para 32. 
43  Nhlabathi para 34. Citing with approval Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause 
94-95. 
44  Nhlabathi para 34. 
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section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA, is to require a balancing of interests between 
affected parties. In this regard the court held that 
[t]here can be circumstances where the absence of a right to compensation on 
expropriation is reasonable and justifiable, and in the public interest (which 
includes the nation's commitment to land reform).45 
Thus an obligation on a landowner to allow an occupier to bury without 
paying compensation can sometimes be justifiable in terms of the limitations 
clause in section 36 the Constitution.46 This is likely to be the case where 
the right to bury is not a major intrusion on the rights of the landowner. 
Applying this to the instant case Bam P concluded that a right not to pay 
compensation would be 
… reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.47 
Having rejected the argument that section 6(2)(dA) is unconstitutional 
because of its failure to provide for compensation, the court then considered 
whether its requirements had been met.48 As will be remembered the three 
requirements in the section are: that the interests of the parties must be 
balanced, that the deceased was residing on the land, and that the land was 
already subject to an established burial practice. On the question of 
balance, despite evidence that the occupier might be evicted, the court 
found that his interests were not outweighed by those of the landowner.49 It 
is noteworthy that in reaching this conclusion the court took into account 
that the evidence concerning a potential eviction was inadequate and 
inconclusive.50 In relation to the second requirement, that the deceased 
must have been residing on the land with the occupier, the court stated that 
the fact that the deceased had, after taking up residence with his son (the 
occupier), left the farm in order to get medical attention and then died in 
hospital did not mean that he was not residing on the land. So this 
requirement had also been met.51 In relation to the final question as to 
whether or not there was an established practice of allowing burials on the 
land, the court found that consent had previously been given for only two 
members of the Nhlabathi family. However, what was also relevant was the 
fact that members of other families had also been buried with consent. This 
                                            
45  Nhlabathi para 34. 
46  Nhlabathi para 35. 
47  Nhlabathi para 35. 
48  Nhlabathi para 36. 
49  Nhlabathi para 37. 
50  Nhlabathi paras 38-39. 
51  Nhlabathi para 40. 
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helped to show that a practice had been established in relation to the land. 
It was not necessary to prove that a practice had been established 
specifically in relation to a particular family.52 The application to bury in 
Nhlabathi was thus successful.53 
The next case in which indigenous burial practices were considered was 
Dlamini. In this case the husband and son of a deceased woman applied to 
bury her either on the land they had previously occupied or on the land they 
currently occupied. The first issue in dispute related to the definition of land 
as referred to in ESTA. The argument raised by the appellants in support of 
their application to bury on the land they had previously occupied was that 
land should be given a meaning broader than its cadastral meaning. They 
pointed out that the pieces of land they had previously and currently 
occupied were farmed as one enterprise and owned by different members 
of a single family. They submitted that the two pieces should therefore be 
regarded as a single land entity for the purposes of ESTA. However, the 
court rejected this argument. Even though the word "land" was not defined 
in ESTA, the Act referred to relationships between a specific landowner and 
occupier. Thus the only relevant owner was the one recognised in the 
Deed's Registry as owning the land currently occupied.54 The consent 
necessary for the establishment of a burial practice could also be given only 
by that owner or predecessors in the title.55 
In holding that the cadastral description of land is essential for establishing 
which piece of land may be subject to a burial practice, the court made the 
following important statement: 
The burial right in s 6(2)(dA) of the Act is an incidence of the right of residence 
contained in s 6(1), which creates a real right in land. Such a right is in principle 
registrable in a Deeds Registry because it constitutes a "burden on the land" 
by reducing the owner's right of ownership of the land and binds successors 
in title. The burial right is in the nature of a personal servitude which the 
occupier has over the property on which he possesses a real right of residence 
at death of a family member who at the time of death was residing on the 
land.56 
The court thus conceptualised burial rights created in terms of ESTA as 
being in the nature of limited real rights. More specifically, the court 
conceptualised them as constituting personal servitudes which are 
registrable. The SCA also affirmed that "land" can be understood only in its 
                                            
52  Nhlabathi paras 41, 42. 
53  Nhlabathi para 44. 
54  Nhlabathi para 14. 
55  Dlamini para 15. 
56  Dlamini para 16. 
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cadastral sense. It was for this reason that the appellants had no right to 
bury their deceased family member on land they had previously occupied. 
The right applied only to the land (and hence the owner) where they were 
living at the time of the death of the family member.57 A further clarification 
of ESTA was that an established burial practice does not have to relate to 
the specific family claiming burial, but to "people residing on the land".58 
An argument raised by the landowner in Dlamini was that since it was he 
who had initially given consent for other burials, he was now at liberty to 
withdraw that consent.59 The court correctly concluded that, while this had 
been the position prior to the passing of the amendment of ESTA, it was no 
longer the position. The effect of the insertion of section 6(2)(dA) was that 
once a burial practice has been established a durable right is conferred on 
the occupier. The landowner may not subsequently withdraw consent 
because this would render the section meaningless.60 The court clarified 
this by stating that the right of a rural occupier to reside is a real right granted 
by ESTA to an occupier in someone else's land, with burial rights being an 
incidence of this right. Thus a subsequent withdrawal of burial permission 
would be an unlawful deprivation of this right.61 The appeal thus succeeded, 
and the SCA ordered that the deceased be buried on the land on which she 
had been living at the time of her death. 
The subsequent case of Bashe v Meyer62 (hereafter Bashe), focused further 
attention on the meaning of the phrase "established practice" in section 
6(2)(dA). Here the court stated that the applicant should prove a "habitual 
way of acting on the part of the owner of the farm over the years".63 The 
court clarified further that what was required was that the 
… occupiers of the farm have been "consistently allowed in a sufficient 
number of cases" to bury members of their families on the farm.64 
On this aspect the court relied on Commissioner for Inland Revenue v SA 
Mutual Unit Trust Management Co Ltd,65 a case involving tax law. In our 
submission, the phrase "over the years" suggests a relatively slow maturing 
requirement for a long-standing practice, and the phrase "sufficient number 
                                            
57  Dlamini para 17. 
58  Dlamini para 19. 
59  Dlamini para 22. 
60  Dlamini para 24. 
61  Dlamini para 26. 
62  2008 JDR 1378 (E). 
63  Bashe v Meyer 2008 JDR 1378 (E) (hereafter Bashe) para 7. 
64  Bashe para 7. 
65  1990 4 SA 529 (A). 
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of cases" is vague. It should be noted, however, that these interpretations 
in Bashe were obiter. The applicant had not claimed that she was relying on 
ESTA for a right to bury. In giving evidence she had merely averred that she 
had been told that her grandparents were buried on the land.66 
In the next relevant matter of Nortje v Maree (hereafter Nortje),67 a 
magistrate granted an interim order allowing an occupier to bury his wife on 
land on which they were residing. The order was granted, unbeknown to the 
applicant and magistrate at the time, against someone who was neither the 
owner nor the person in charge of the land. Subsequent to the rule nisi the 
deceased was buried. On the return day, when the magistrate realised that 
the order had been granted against the incorrect party, he refused to confirm 
it. The appellant then appealed against this refusal. The appeal was upheld 
on the basis that the magistrate had erred in classifying the interdict as an 
interim order. By its nature it was in fact a final order. He could not discharge 
it because he was functus officio in the matter.68 
Although it upheld the appeal, in Nortje the land claims court was not 
satisfied that the evidence presented to the magistrate had been sufficient 
for the granting of a final order. In particular, the court evaluated if the 
applicant had satisfied the grounds in section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA. It found that 
there was no evidence to establish that the rights of either party would be 
unfairly prejudiced if the court favoured the other.69 Nor was there evidence 
that that the deceased had been residing on the land at the time of her 
death.70 Furthermore, the applicant had merely stated that it was his culture 
to bury within a week and did not give reasons why it had to be on the farm. 
The court thus found that the applicant had not proved that it was part of his 
culture to bury deceased family members on the same land where they had 
lived. However, because the court had already found that the decision by 
the magistrate was a final order, his decision could not be overturned and 
so these findings as to facts were irrelevant to the case. 
In summary, it was clear by 2013 that the right to burial conferred on rural 
land occupiers by section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA had survived constitutional 
challenge. Proponents of Western notions of the inviolability of land 
ownership had clearly been unsuccessful in subverting it. Three 
requirements for the implementation of this right, namely, balancing in the 
                                            
66  Bashe para 9. 
67  2013 JDR 1285 (LC). 
68  Nortje v Maree 2013 JDR 1285 (LC) (hereafter Nortje) para 23. 
69  Nortje para 31. 
70  Nortje para 31. 
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sense of weighing up respective degrees of prejudice to the parties, relevant 
religious or cultural beliefs, and an established practice of consent to burials 
had been clarified by judgments interpreting the section. A noticeable 
feature of those judgments was acceptance of a fourth requirement that 
both the occupier seeking to assert a right to burial and the deceased person 
must have been resident on the land at the time of the death.71 
3 Selomo v Doman 2014 JDR 0780 (LCC) 
Judgment was delivered by Spilg J of the Land Claims Court. The case 
involved an urgent application by Mr Selomo in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of 
ESTA to bury his deceased daughter at the family gravesite on a farm where 
he had previously resided. In the subsections below we set out the facts and 
contentions of the parties, explain the judgment and then discuss it. 
3.1 The facts of the case 
The case was heard as an urgent application a month after the death of the 
22 year-old daughter of the applicant. He had not as yet been able to bury 
her and her body was therefore still lying in a morgue. He sought permission 
from the court to bury her on a farm where he and she had previously 
resided. Specifically, he wished to bury her in a family gravesite which had 
been fenced off and contained the bodies of his parents and three others of 
his children.72 He was an elderly man who had been born on the farm in 
1948. Both he and his parents had lived on the farm most of their lives and 
three of his children still lived there. However, he and his deceased daughter 
had left the farm approximately eight years previously.73 In 2005 he had 
been paid R8 000 for vacating the farm and signing a waiver of any rights 
to it. Many of his relatives, including ancestors several generations back, 
were buried on the farm. The application was for a burial the following day.74 
The family gravesite on the farm where the applicant wished to bury his 
daughter had been recognised by previous landowners.75 However, the 
current landowner (the respondent) refused to allow access to the burial site 
and so the planned burial could not take place.76 
                                            
71  In accepting that the deceased could have been temporarily moved to hospital for 
treatment shortly before his death Dlamini was not an exception. The deceased was 
still legally resident on the land when death occurred. 
72  Selomo v Doman 2014 JDR 0780 (LCC) (hereafter Selomo) para 4. 
73  Selomo para 7. 
74  Selomo para 1. 
75  Selomo para 4. 
76  Selomo para 5. 
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3.2 Contentions of the parties 
The two main points at issue were whether the applicant was an occupier 
in terms of ESTA and whether he and his daughter were still residing on the 
farm at the time of her death.77 Fulfilment of these requirements was 
necessary in order to bring them within the ambit of section 6(2)(dA). 
3.2.1 Applicant 
The applicant averred that it was crucial for the practice of his religion and 
his Bapedi culture that his daughter be promptly buried on the family 
gravesite close to her ancestors in order to receive their company and 
counsel.78 He conceded that in 2005 he had in return for payment signed a 
letter in terms of which he agreed to leave the farm and waive his rights to 
it, but he alleged that this waiver of rights was unenforceable.79 The 
applicant contended further that his daughter had remained resident on the 
farm at the time of her death, because she had only temporarily moved 
elsewhere for education and then later for health care reasons. Similarly, he 
himself had temporarily moved elsewhere merely in order to facilitate his 
children's education by living close to their schools.80 
3.2.2 Respondent 
Dr Doman, the landowner, alleged that neither the applicant nor his 
daughter were currently occupiers in terms of ESTA, both having left the 
farm in the distant past some seven to nine years previously.81 In an attempt 
to further weaken the applicant's family connection to the farm, he pointed 
out that the remaining three children of the applicant who still resided on the 
farm were currently defending an eviction application which he had brought 
against them.82 He also averred that the applicant had failed to prove that 
he earned less than R5 000 a month, which evidence was essential to bring 
him within the ambit of ESTA.83 
3.3 The judgment 
After summarising the claims of the parties Spilg J expressed the opinion 
that the key legal issue was whether the applicant's rights to bury were 
                                            
77  Selomo para 10. 
78  Selomo para 1. 
79  Selomo paras 11-13. 
80  Selomo paras 15-16. 
81  Selomo para 7. 
82  Selomo para 8. 
83  Selomo para 12. 
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"strictly limited to those provided for under section 6(dA) (sic) of ESTA".84 
He thus signalled early on that he was willing to consider authority not raised 
by the parties. He accepted that from the facts neither the applicant nor his 
daughter was living on the farm at the time of her death. However, the 
question was whether they could nevertheless still be regarded as residing 
on the farm. The court considered the argument by the applicant that his 
daughter lived elsewhere only for education and then later for health care 
reasons, and that he himself lived elsewhere merely to facilitate his 
children's education.85 The court assessed this contention in the light of the 
SCA decision in Kiepersol Poultry farm (Pty) Ltd v Phasiya.86 Here the SCA 
had accepted the definition of "reside" from Barrie v Ferrois87 as 
… his place of abode, the place where he sleeps after the work of the day is 
done ...The essence of the word is the notion of "permanent home.88 
In then applying this definition to the instant facts in Selomo Spilg J 
commented: 
… the allegations of continued residence are challenged to a material degree 
and there is the issue of a waiver of rights, in consideration for being paid 
compensation.89 
This implied strongly, although it was not stated in as many words, that there 
would be a finding that the applicant and his daughter were no longer 
residing on the land as required by section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA and thus did 
not qualify as occupiers with burial rights in terms of that Act.90 
Before making this somewhat vague statement, however, the court took a 
brief side-step and considered whether or not the applicant might perhaps 
qualify as a labour tenant in terms of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 
(hereafter Labour Tenants Act).91 The applicant had not alleged that he was 
a labour tenant, nor had he claimed any rights in terms of the Labour 
Tenants Act. Despite this, the court decided that, on the agreed facts, the 
applicant was a labour tenant in terms of the Labour Tenants Act and that 
his daughter would therefore have qualified as an associate in terms of that 
                                            
84  Selomo para 14. 
85  Selomo paras 15-16. 
86  2010 3 SA 152 (SCA). 
87  1987 2 SA 709 (C) 714F. 
88  Selomo para 17. 
89  Selomo para 23. 
90  The subsequent case of Mathebula v Harry 2015 JDR 1029 (LCC) considered the 
question of residence in more detail. In the light of the finding in Selomo that the parties 
were not resident it is not necessary to consider this judgment. 
91  3 of 1996. See Selomo paras 20-21. 
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Act.92 The court concluded that it was justified in considering this, even 
though it had not been raised by the applicant. This was because, first, the 
matter was an urgent one and so the parties had had little time to prepare 
on what was a very sensitive issue. Secondly, even though the respondent 
claimed that the applicant's residence had terminated some eight years 
previously, the former landowner had, five years after that, consented to the 
burial of a child of the applicant and also to the burials of other relatives still 
residing on the land.93 
The court went on to assert that the rights legislatively afforded to a labour 
tenant and his dependents included the right to continue to occupy and use 
land they had been using on 2 June 1995. Interpreting this extensively, the 
court concluded that this right would include access to a gravesite for burial, 
and was not dependent on current residence.94 In then applying this to the 
instant matter the court decided that the rights of the applicant and his 
children existing as at 2 June 1995 could be taken into account. It was 
common cause that he had been using land on the farm at that date and 
there would be no prejudice to the respondent.95 The court stated that the 
applicant's claim to bury under ESTA was "bolstered" by his rights in terms 
of the Labour Tenants Act and by the fact that he had been given such a 
right by a previous owner some three years prior to the application.96 The 
court then concluded that 
[t]he effect is that the applicant has a right exercisable by the applicant to bury 
his daughter on the ancestral gravesite on the farm Pennsylvania.97 
After reaching this conclusion, the court noted that s 6(2)(dA) of ESTA had 
been created to reverse the position taken in Nkosi, and that Dlamini had 
subsequently confirmed that this section prevents landowners from 
terminating a practice of allowing burials once it is well established.98 Spilg 
J then stated: 
[d]espite the amendments ESTA therefore has limitations which do not simply 
permit subsequent burials on established ancestral gravesites of family members 
and that "residence" remains a key requirement. In short, fervent religious or 
cultural beliefs that the spirits of the ancestors should be close to those who are 
recently departed or close to the homestead of those living are not alone a 
                                            
92  Section 1 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (hereafter Labour 
Tenants Act); Selomo para 22. 
93  Selomo paras 23-24. 
94  Selomo para 21. 
95  Selomo para 25. 
96  Selomo para 26. 
97  Selomo para 27. 
98  Selomo para 35. 
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sufficient basis to grant a continued right of burial on even a well-established 
ancestral gravesite.99 
In further support of its main conclusion that a burial should be allowed, the 
court then referred to Hattingh v Juta (hereafter Hattingh).100 In this matter 
the Constitutional Court had considered how to balance the rights of 
occupiers with those of landowners in cases falling within the ambit of 
ESTA, although not specifically in respect of burial. What Spilg J found 
significant was that the Constitutional Court, in interpreting the phrase 
"balanced with the rights of the owner or person in charge" in the preamble 
to section 6(2) of ESTA, had decided that broad concepts of justice and 
equity could guide courts in determining the rights of the occupiers of 
land.101 
The court then went on to indicate that there were two additional factors that 
it "bears in mind" in granting the applicant a right of burial.102 However, it is 
entirely unclear from the judgment what role these factors played and 
whether the court considered them relevant to ESTA and/or the Labour 
Tenants Act. The court listed them as: first, the applicant could be said to 
have retained a "residual" right to bury because the previous landowner had 
permitted of one of the applicant's children to be buried on the farm in 
2010.103 No authority was provided for this proposition. Secondly, the 
applicant's position was strengthened by virtue of the fact that the 
respondent had permitted the applicant's children who still lived on the farm 
to visit and maintain the family gravesite. Spilg J also noted that ESTA is 
silent on whether there is a right to visit for a non-occupier, but stated, 
without giving any reason, that it was still relevant that the respondent had 
permitted the applicant to continue to visit the family gravesite even after 
the applicant had vacated the farm.104 
The court then returned to the issue of fairness although, surprisingly, 
without again referring to Hattingh, which would have been a useful 
authority for court powers in this regard. Spilg J reasoned that the addition 
of a new grave at the existing familial gravesite would cause very little 
prejudice to the respondent. The gravesite was a piece of land that he 
already could not make use of and which the applicant was already entitled 
to visit and maintain. Thus, the addition of one more grave would not result 
                                            
99  Selomo para 35. 
100  2013 3 SA 275 (CC) paragraphs 32-33. See Selomo paras 36-37. 
101  Hattingh v Juta 2013 3 SA 275 (CC) (hereafter Hattingh) paras 30-33. 
102  Selomo para 38. 
103  Selomo para 38. 
104  Selomo para 39. 
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in any greater diminution of the respondent landowner's real rights than that 
which he had already suffered.105 The court weighed this slight diminution 
of rights against the freedom to exercise one's beliefs and religion in respect 
of the applicant's need to bury his daughter near other deceased family 
members for her comfort. The court stated: 
[to] refuse to respect these deeply held convictions of a father, particularly 
when they relate to a child who passed away much too soon and before his 
eyes, is to strip him of dignity.106 
He recognised that dignity, religion and culture should not overshadow real 
rights, but reasoned that the diminution of a real right in this case was 
negligible.107  
The court then returned to further consideration of ESTA. As elsewhere in 
the judgment,108 Spilg J speculated on possible considerations without 
reaching definitive conclusions on whether or how they supported a right to 
burial for the applicant's daughter. First, he pondered on whether the term 
"residing" in section 6(2)(dA) could possibly be very widely interpreted by a 
court as including a non-resident child of a resident.109 Secondly, he 
questioned whether the fact that the previous landowner had allowed the 
burial of one of the applicant's children in 2010 might not allow the applicant 
to be classed as a resident, despite the fact that he had left the farm about 
eight years ago.110 Thirdly, the court questioned whether it might not be 
proper to adopt an extremely wide interpretation of burial rights in terms of 
ESTA, given that it had been developed to protect occupiers, and in view of 
the purposes of the Labour Tenants Act and sections 7 and 25(6) of the 
Constitution. Finally, Spilg J speculated on whether, even if the applicant 
himself did not have a right to be buried on the farm because he had left it, 
his daughter still had an entitlement. After raising but not answering any of 
these four questions, he finally concluded again that the applicant did have 
a right to bury his daughter at the family gravesite.111 
3.4 The appeal 
                                            
105  Selomo paras 40-41. 
106  Selomo para 42. 
107  Selomo para 43. 
108  See further the next section below. 
109  Selomo para 44(a). 
110  Here Spilg J raised a query concerning a possible extended interpretation of ss 5, 6(2) 
and 8 of ESTA. 
111  Selomo para 44. 
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Before discussing the judgment of Spilg J, it is appropriate to refer briefly to 
an appeal from it which occurred.112 Doman appealed to the SCA. This 
appeal was heard some two and a half years after the burial. The SCA 
simply confirmed the fact that the LCC had allowed the burial in terms of the 
Labour Tenants Act113 and stated "We specifically refrain from endorsing 
the reasoning of the court below".114 However, the appeal was dismissed in 
terms of section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, which 
states that when the "issues are of such a nature that the decision sought 
will have no practical effect or result, the appeal may be dismissed on this 
ground alone". The court, with the appellant conceding, stated that it would 
be "highly offensive" to exhume and rebury the daughter, and this rendered 
the appeal moot.115 Thus the nature of the matter being dealt with (a 
completed burial) effectively prevented this decision from being considered 
by the SCA, and so it still stands. 
4 Discussion 
In considering the rather meandering nature of some of Spilg J's reasoning 
in the LCC decision in Selomo it needs to be kept in mind that the matter 
was presented urgently at court on the day prior to the requested burial on 
the farm.116 In view of this and the length of time that the applicant's 
daughter's body had remained unburied, Spilg J understandably felt it 
necessary to give a decision on the same day as hearing the submissions 
of the parties. He was thus sensitive to the fact that in terms of the 
applicant's culture prompt decisions on burials of family members were 
essential. In ordering immediately after hearing the evidence that the burial 
could lawfully take place, he had had very little time to contemplate the 
issues deeply. He provided his reasons in favour of the requested burial just 
over a year later.117 In formulating those reasons, he was to some extent 
limited by the fact that the SCA in Nkosi had found that ESTA had provided 
no burial right for occupiers prior to the insertion of section 6(2)(dA). This 
became a difficulty because of his own finding that even the latter provision 
was of limited use because the applicant in Selomo had not made out a 
good case in terms of it.118 
                                            
112  Döman v Selomo 2015 JDR 1982 (SCA) (hereafter the Appeal). 
113  The Appeal para 9. 
114  The Appeal para 9. 
115  The Appeal para 10. 
116  Selomo para 1. 
117  The Appeal para 9. 
118  See the discussion of Selomo para 23 in the previous section above. 
J PARKER AND FN ZAAL  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  20 
Spilg J got around the difficulties imposed by ESTA's restrictions and the 
applicant's departure from the farm with his averment that the applicant's 
rights were not "strictly limited to those provided for under section 6(dA)(sic) 
of ESTA".119 This enabled him to apply the Labour Tenants Act. In so doing, 
he helped the applicant to strengthen his case in a manner that would 
certainly offend traditional proponents of judicial neutrality as per the 
accusatorial system.120 From the perspective of such proponents, Spilg J's 
introduction in his judgment, mero motu, of an entirely fresh line of argument 
based on the Labour Tenants Act that had never been advanced by the 
applicant's legal representative121 would be questionable. Had the possible 
applicability of the Labour Tenants Act been put to the respondent during 
the hearing, he would at least have had an opportunity to offer counter 
arguments. Although judges of course have an obligation to consider all 
potentially relevant law, the construction by the court of a legal argument on 
behalf of one of the parties ex post facto the hearing, based on legislation 
that had not been considered by either of the parties, and which was 
interpreted as being of crucial importance for the ultimate result, is a 
technical weakness in the approach taken by Spilg J. 
Aside from the fact that the audi alteram partem principle was thus not 
properly applied, there are further difficulties with the Selomo judgment. 
Since the court purported to frame its initial reasoning in favour of a right to 
bury in terms of the Labour Tenants Act, it is strange that it dealt only briefly 
with this, and then considered throughout the judgment mainly the 
requirements set by ESTA. The purported application of the latter Act is in 
many respects problematic. For example, as has been noted, in Dlamini the 
court held that a right to burial cannot exist on land not currently occupied. 
Although that aspect of the facts was the same in Selomo, Spilg J made no 
reference to this ruling. However, after accepting that the applicant had 
completely failed to meet the residence requirements needed for a right to 
                                            
119  Selomo para 14. 
120  In Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank SA Ltd 2004 4 SA 1 (SCA) 5 para C, 
Harms JA asserted that "a balancing act by the judicial officer is required because 
there is a thin dividing line between managing a trial and getting involved in the fray". 
This dictum was subsequently cited with approval in City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council v Ngobeni 2012 ZASCA 55 (30 March 2012) para 29. Here, 
Mhlantla JA stressed the importance of judicial officers remaining entirely neutral in 
civil matters. He also cited with approval some remarks by Lord Denning in Jones v 
National Coal Board 1957 2 All ER 155 (CA) 159A-B to the effect that judicial officers 
must always be careful to maintain a passive, completely neutral role function. 
121  In Selomo para 22 of his judgment he noted in regard to the applicant's submissions 
that: "I accept that no case was made out for rights either as a labour tenant or 
associate and that in the eviction proceedings his children only asserted rights under 
ESTA without amplifying that the right claimed might include those of a labour tenant". 
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bury in terms of s 6(2)(dA) of ESTA,122 Spilg J still claimed - strangely - that 
the applicant's residence at the farm until 2005, and the continued 
occupation thereafter by some of his children, were nevertheless factors 
"bolstering" his right to bury.123 In our submission, the logic which the court 
should have applied in relation to ESTA should have been binary. Either the 
applicant qualified in terms of ESTA and thus had a right to bury in terms of 
ESTA, or he did not. Since according to the court's own reasoning he did 
not qualify in terms of ESTA, it should have been impossible to use any 
other factors to "bolster" his claim in terms of it.  
The specific conclusion of the court about halfway through the judgment124 
that as a result of the bolstering of his claim the applicant could lawfully bury 
his daughter on the farm is also surprising. It will be remembered that Spilg 
J concluded here that  
[t]he effect is that the applicant has a right … to bury his daughter on the 
ancestral gravesite on the farm Pennsylvania.125 
This finding seems odd when just four paragraphs earlier the court had 
stated that two of the ESTA prerequisites for a burial right – that the 
applicant must be a current occupier and that the deceased must have been 
residing on the land – had been "challenged to a material degree".126 The 
court thus appears to have tried to apply ESTA in support of its earlier 
decision in terms of the Labour Tenants Act without recognising that this 
was impossible because the prerequisites of section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA had 
not been met. 
Presumably because of an appreciation that its reasoning so far could be 
open to challenge, the court continued to provide many additional 
justifications in support of its decision to accord a right to burial to the 
applicant. Spilg J's purported reliance on the Constitutional Court judgment 
in Hattingh then followed. Although Hattingh concerned the application of 
ESTA, it did not specifically concern a right to burial. As will be remembered, 
what Spilg J considered to be of particular relevance was the Constitutional 
Court's emphasis upon the application of broad principles of fairness when 
balancing the rights of the parties. Since the applicant in Selomo had 
completely failed to meet the burial right requirements of ESTA when he 
abandoned residence and accepted payment for a waiver of his rights to the 
                                            
122  Selomo para 23 read with para 26. 
123  Selomo para 23. 
124  Selomo para 27. 
125  Selomo para 27. 
126  Selomo para 23. 
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land, there was arguably little to put in the balance from his side. 
Furthermore, since Spilg J's original argument had been framed in terms of 
the Labour Tenants Act, this reliance on an authority interpreting ESTA was 
problematic.127 
In seeking further reasons to buttress the burial right of the applicant the 
court then concluded that it could also be argued that he had a residual right 
to burial.128 As will be remembered, Spilg J characterised this right as arising 
from the fact that the previous landowner had permitted one of the 
applicant's children to be buried on the land. In the court's view, the resulting 
residual right was strengthened by the fact that the respondent had 
permitted the applicant and his children to visit and maintain the family 
gravesite subsequent to the applicant's departure from the farm. With 
respect, these factors are of very little relevance. There is no authority for 
the proposition that a single burial permitted by a previous landowner should 
reduce the rights of the present landowner.129 And since the applicant's 
rights of visitation and gravesite maintenance were not in dispute in Selomo, 
the fact that the respondent permitted these activities was completely 
irrelevant.130 
In the next part of the judgment, the court's analysis of the very limited 
prejudice that a burial would cause for the respondent, as weighed against 
the considerable prejudice and harm to his dignity suffered by the applicant 
through the delay in the burial of his daughter and the contravention of his 
religious beliefs, potentially provided it with perhaps the strongest argument 
at its disposal in favour of the applicant.131 The court quite correctly 
appreciated that respect for the dead in this instance required respect for 
the culture and dignity of the applicant. However, it failed to strengthen this 
argument by citing the constitutional rights of respect for dignity and 
religious and cultural freedom at this point in the judgment.132 Nor did it cite 
                                            
127  We further discuss the applicability of Hattingh below. 
128  Selomo para 38. 
129  As has been noted, in Nhlabathi even two burials from the same family were not 
regarded as sufficient. Additional burials were needed to constitute an established 
practice showing that consent had routinely been granted by the landowner. 
130  Selomo paras 39-40. There is nothing in either ESTA or the Labour Tenants Act to 
suggest that allowing visitation and the maintenance of gravesites compels 
landowners to subsequently allow more burials. 
131  Selomo paras 41-43. As noted above, in Nhlabathi para 35 Bam P treated a minimal 
degree of prejudice to a landowner as a factor weighing in favour of a right to burial 
for an occupier. Spilg J could therefore have cited Nhlabathi as authority on this point, 
but did not do so. 
132  Section 10 of the Constitution requires respect for human dignity. S 15 upholds 
freedom of religion, belief and opinion. S 31(1) supports rights to engage in cultural 
and religious practices. 
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here the Constitutional Court's judgment in Hattingh, which could have been 
of some assistance by supporting court discretion and consideration of 
issues of fairness.133 Instead of making the most of reasoning based on 
fundamental constitutional rights, the court moved on to consider four 
possible further grounds supposedly in favour of the applicant.134 
In relation to the four grounds presented as unanswered questions 
immediately before the court reached its final conclusion on the question of 
the burial,135 the idea that the word "residing" in section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA 
might be extensively interpreted to include the previously resident child of a 
previously resident occupier seems far-fetched. It is weakened further by 
Spilg J's own previous finding that the applicant was not an occupier in 
terms of ESTA and his daughter was not residing on the land at the time of 
her death.136 Such an interpretation would also not have been supported by 
the previous SCA judgments relating to the concept of residence in 
ESTA.137 In relation to the second query concerning the application of the 
wording of sections 5, 8 and the preamble to section 6(2) of ESTA, these 
are all of limited assistance because they do not deal directly with the issue 
of burial. As noted earlier, the fact that a previous landowner had granted 
the applicant a right to bury another child is also of limited relevance. On the 
third query raised by Spilg J, sections 5 and 6(2) of ESTA were not designed 
to be read with the Labour Tenants Act, and in any event the court did not 
follow through by actually undertaking that exercise. The same criticism of 
incomplete reasoning applies to the court's brief references to sections 7 
and 25(6) of the Constitution. The court could, for example, have picked out 
                                            
133  Admittedly, and as we have noted above, Hattingh would have been of limited 
assistance because it was an interpretation of ESTA. However, it did support the 
notion of wide discretionary powers for courts based on broad considerations of 
fairness when assessing the rights of rural land occupiers. Also, in seeking 
constitutional court authorities Spilg J need not have confined himself only to Hattingh. 
As pointed out by Cornell et al Dignity Jurisprudence xiii, there is a substantial body 
of Constitutional Court case law affirming the importance of upholding dignity. As the 
authors point out (at xiii), there are many cases showing that the Constitutional Court's 
dignity jurisprudence has been "shaped and influenced by the African ethical notion of 
Ubuntu which demands the recognition and respect of the dignity of all others". 
134  Selomo para 44. 
135  Selomo para 44 as discussed in the previous section, above. 
136  Selomo para 23. 
137  Barrie v Ferrois 1987 2 SA 709 (C) 714F cited with approval by the SCA in Kiepersol 
Poultry Farm (Pty) Ltd v Phasiya 2010 3 SA 152 (SCA) defined "reside": "It is his place 
of abode, the place where he sleeps after the work of the day is done ... It does not 
include one's weekend cottage unless one is residing there ... The essence of the 
word is the notion of 'permanent home'". Also, as has been noted, in Nhlabathi the 
deceased had left the land only shortly before dying and in order to receive hospital 
treatment. This contrasts with the situation of the deceased in Selomo who had left 
the land many years before her death. 
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the issues of the protection of dignity as referred to in section 7(1) and 
redress for land occupiers affected by past discriminatory laws as referred 
to in section 25(6), and then analysed the nature of their applicability to the 
instant case. By not doing so, it left the judgment incomplete on this 
important aspect. 
In relation to the brief reference to the Labour Tenants Act in paragraph 44c, 
it is important to note that this Act does not expressly refer to any right to 
burial. If one reverts back to the court's original discussion of the Act in 
paragraphs 20-25, it appears that the court's reasoning was that, although 
burial rights are not specifically referred to in the Labour Tenants Act, they 
could impliedly be included in the use rights conferred on labour tenants.138 
And these rights, Spilg J seemed to surmise, could even outlive occupation 
of the farm by a labour tenant. Both the original discussion and paragraph 
44c are once again inconclusive. They seem to have been added in as part 
of the process (seen throughout the judgment) of attempting to bolster a 
right of the applicant to bury his daughter. 
For the fourth and last proposition in paragraph 44 the court surmised that, 
quite apart from possible interpretations of the Labour Tenants Act and 
ESTA, the applicant had a right to continue using the familial site for burials, 
at least for his children.139 It is not clear where this right originated. It 
appears that perhaps the court was referencing the fact that three years 
before the hearing in the instant case the applicant had been permitted by 
the previous landowner to bury another deceased child. The relevance of 
this is unclear in the light of the fact that the current landowner had now 
refused consent for the burial of the daughter. As appears from our 
summary of it above Dlamini is authority for the proposition that a right to 
bury is either dependent on the consent of the landowner, or it must be 
derived from ESTA, in which case the landowner is no longer free to 
withdraw such consent. It would seem that, as the right in casu did not exist 
within ESTA, it could have arisen only out of consent given by the 
landowner, which consent was not forthcoming in Selomo. 
The positing of four largely irrelevant grounds in paragraph 44 without 
following through by stating definitively what their consequences were for 
                                            
138  Labour Tenants Act s 3(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, but subject 
to the provisions of subsection (2), a person who was a labour tenant on 2 June 1995 
shall have the right with his or her family members (a) to occupy and use that part of 
the farm in question which he or she or his or her associate was using and occupying 
on that date. 
139  Selomo para 44d. 
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the instant case strengthens the impression of a judgment composed as a 
meandering journey by a judge seeking authority for a decision already 
made. In considering the judgment as a whole, it is curious that the court, 
after having decided early on that the applicant did qualify as a labour 
tenant, after having claimed that it was permissible for the court to reach 
such finding even though this was not sought by the applicant,140 and after 
having decided that the rights the applicant enjoyed in terms of the Labour 
Tenants Act included the right to bury, did not merely decide the matter on 
this basis alone. It is difficult to fathom why the court, after concluding that 
an implied burial right existed in terms of the Labour Tenants Act, felt the 
need to devote the bulk of the rest of its judgment to attempting to support 
this right by deploying a range of mostly strained or incomplete 
interpretations of ESTA. It appeared to view ESTA and the Labour Tenants 
Act as two halves which needed to make a whole. It is the tendency to try 
to read these two Acts together when they are in fact stand-alone 
Enactments which explains much of the vagueness of the judgment. 
5 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, Spilg J was confronted with the dilemma – faced by many 
courts – that a strict application of the most explicit legislation – even with 
an infusion of principles of justice and equity – would result in an outcome 
which would be outrageously unfair to poor, rural and very vulnerable 
dependant people, and where the only way to assist them in the retention 
of some dignity and to show respect for their religion and culture was to 
fudge the legal principles or, as in this case, make a decision that could not 
easily be undone and then hope for the best. It appears that, having 
permitted a burial to occur on the farm and in subsequently composing his 
reasons, Spilg J had to hunt around to find grounds in the law. When these 
were not forthcoming and appeared to have been negated by the fact that 
the applicant was not an occupier and had relied only on ESTA, he added 
together various possible rights, hoping that together, somewhere, they 
would total a burial right – which right had already been granted. Although 
the decision can therefore be criticised as bad in law, that does not 
necessarily make it a bad decision from the point of view of either party. For 
the applicant it was welcome relief during a stressful time of bereavement. 
For the respondent it appears that the impact was minimal, if anything at all. 
Thus, in fairness to Spilg J, despite being under considerable time pressure 
when first hearing the matter, he achieved a result which was humane and 
compassionate. He appreciated that for adherents of indigenous culture 
                                            
140  Selomo paras 23-24. 
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respect for the dignity of a deceased family member requires a burial in the 
familial gravesite. 
It is difficult to predict how Selomo will stand the test of time as a precedent 
guiding future litigants. On the facts, it serves as an affirmation of greatly 
extended legal recognition of indigenous familial burial practices. A right of 
burial can now be claimed even where both a land occupier and the family 
member to be buried have been absent from the land for many years. Even 
receipt of payment in return for a waiver of rights to the land will not defeat 
an occupier's right to bury a family member at a rural family gravesite. 
However, it remains to be seen whether any future court would accept the 
serpentine reasoning in Selomo, particularly concerning the applicability of 
ESTA in such circumstances. It seems likely that future courts would have 
some difficulty in agreeing that section 6(2)(dA) of that Act is worded broadly 
enough to accord burial rights to previous occupiers who no longer have 
residence. Whether they would accept the alternative but undeveloped 
reasoning based on an implied right arising in terms of the Labour Tenants 
Act or directly from the Constitution remains to be seen.141 They might be 
tempted to do so where prejudice to a landowner is limited, given the 
importance of respecting indigenous burial practices. As we have 
suggested, although the Labour Tenants Act provides little scope because 
it makes no reference to burial, an argument based directly on constitutional 
rights could potentially be developed to provide a strong case.142 The court 
in Selomo should have considered this further. Two lessons for landowners 
involved in similar matters in the future are that they should come to court 
prepared to prove significant prejudice relating to the use of their land and 
not base their submissions only on ESTA. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Cornell et al Dignity Jurisprudence 
Cornell D et al (eds) The Dignity Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa: Cases and Materials, Volumes I and II (Fordham University 
Press New York 2013) 
                                            
141  Section 10 of the Constitution - human dignity, s 15 - the right to freedom of religion 
and belief, and ss 30 and 31 - the protection of cultural and religious rights. 
142  Arguments based on the protection of dignity, the protection of cultural and religious 
rights, and the reversal of past discriminatory practices could all potentially be applied 
to previous occupiers of rural land. 
J PARKER AND FN ZAAL  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  27 
Ngubane 2004 Indilinga 
Ngubane S "Traditional Practices on Burial Systems with Special Reference 
to the Zulu People of South Africa" 2004 Indilinga – African Journal of 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems 171-177 
Setsiba Mourning Rituals and Practices 
Setsiba THS Mourning Rituals and Practices in Contemporary South African 
Townships: A Phenomenological Study (PhD-thesis University of Zululand 
2012) 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause 
Van Der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative 
Analysis of Section 25 of the South African Constitution of 1996 (Juta Cape 
Town 1997) 
Case law 
Barrie v Ferrois 1987 2 SA 709 (C) 
Bashe v Meyer 2008 JDR 1378 (E) 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 
(CC) 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Council v Ngobeni 2012 ZASCA 55 (30 
March 2012) 
Dibley v Furter 1951 4 SA 73 (C) 
Dlamini v Joosten 2006 3 SA 342 (SCA) 
Döman v Selomo 2015 JDR 1982 (SCA) 
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) 
Hattingh v Juta 2013 3 SA 275 (CC) 
Jones v National Coal Board 1957 2 All ER 155 (CA) 
Kiepersol Poultry Farm (Pty) Ltd v Phasiya 2010 3 SA 152 (SCA) 
Mathebula v Harry 2015 JDR 1029 (LCC) 
J PARKER AND FN ZAAL  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  28 
Nhlabathi v Fick 2003 JDR 0226 (LCC) 
Nkosi v Bűhrmann 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA) 
Nortje v Maree 2013 JDR 1285 (LC) 
S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) 
Selomo v Doman 2014 JDR 0780 (LCC) 
Serole v Pienaar 2000 1 SA 328 (LCC) 
Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank SA Ltd 2004 4 SA 1 (SCA) 
Legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 
Land Affairs General Amendment Act 51 of 2001 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 
Government publications 
GN R1632 in GG 19587 of 18 December 1998 
List of Abbreviations 
ESTA Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
1997 
LCC Land Claims Court 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
